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UNSETTLED WEATHER: THE NEED FOR CLEAR
RULES GOVERNING INTRUSION INTO
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
Blake R. Hills *

I. INTRODUCTION
Presidents, porn stars, and terrorists. What do they have in common? They
have all been involved in recent controversies involving government intrusion into
attorney-client communications. 1 While individual presidents, porn stars, and
terrorists will come and go, the need for clear rules on intrusion into attorney-client
communication will not.
Anyone who has watched television in the last fifty years is familiar with
the pre-interrogation warning of, “you have the right to remain silent and the right to
talk to a lawyer,” from Miranda v. Arizona. 2 But what does the right to talk to a
lawyer mean? Does it mean that a criminal defendant has an absolute right to speak
to a lawyer without the government eavesdropping? Or does it mean that the
government can be privy to some attorney-client conversations, but cannot use the
information in a way that prejudices the defendant? If a showing of prejudice is
required, who has the burden of showing it? What is the remedy?
The United States Supreme Court answered some of these questions in the
landmark case of Weatherford v. Bursey. 3 Unfortunately, it failed to answer others.
Specifically, the Court failed to answer the questions of whether prejudice must be
shown, and if so, who bears the burden. This has led to a split between the circuits,
with varying answers to these questions. The resulting system of rules that depend
on location suggests that the Supreme Court should provide further clarification of
the law surrounding government intrusion into attorney-client communications. The
current system is not only inconsistent, it is unfair.

*
Prosecuting Attorney, Summit County Utah Attorney’s Office. J.D., S.J. Quinney University of Utah
College of Law (1998). The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect those of the Summit County Attorney’s Office.
1. E.g., Nicolas Niarchos, Has the NSA Wiretapping Violated Attorney-Client Privilege?, THE
NATION (Feb. 4, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/has-nsa-wiretapping-violated-attorney-clientprivilege/ [https://perma.cc/H6HL-74VV] (discussing government monitoring of attorney-client
conversations of those accused of terrorist acts); Jan Wolfe, Factbox: How Does U.S. Attorney-Client
Privilege Rule Apply to FBI Raid on Trump’s Lawyer?, REUTERS (Apr. 16, 2018, 4:57 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-privilege-factbox/factbox-how-does-u-s-attorneyclient-privilege-rule-apply-to-fbi-raid-on-trumps-lawyer-idUSKBN1HN32R
[https://perma.cc/G2J4UBAX] (noting the controversy over the FBI raid on the office of President Trump’s attorney who paid
$130,000 to porn star Stormy Daniels, allegedly on Trump’s behalf).
2. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that appropriate procedural safeguards are to be used to protect
a suspect’s right against self-incrimination and to inform the suspect about the right to counsel).
3. 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
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This Article proceeds in six parts. Part II examines the background of the
right to counsel of the Sixth Amendment. Part III contains an overview of the
privilege of attorney-client communications. Part IV examines the Weatherford
decision, with discussion on what the Supreme Court did and did not say about
government intrusion into attorney-client communications. Part V surveys the split
of authority in the case law about the requirement of establishing prejudice from
intrusions into attorney-client communications. Part VI discusses the core principle
behind the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Finally, Part VII
suggests that the Court should rely on general principles of fairness to establish clear
rules about government intrusion into attorney-client communications.
II. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” 4
The Sixth Amendment has been called “the heartland of constitutional criminal
procedure.” 5 In regard to the right to counsel, the central principles are “innocence
protection and truth-seeking.” 6 The most prominent value underlying the Supreme
Court’s case law on the right to counsel is fairness. 7
The Supreme Court’s first major discussion of the right to counsel occurred
in Powell v. Alabama. 8 The Court held that due process requires a trial court to
appoint counsel for defendants in capital cases. 9 In so holding, the Court noted the
unfairness of having the defendants proceed without counsel in spite of their
ignorance and illiteracy, their youth, the public hostility, and their isolation from
family and friends. 10
The Supreme Court also invoked the value of fairness in the landmark right
to counsel case of Gideon v. Wainwright. 11 The Court held that indigent defendants

4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The full text of the Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
5. Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 641 (1996).
6. Id. at 705. The right to counsel makes all the other rights of the Sixth Amendment possible
because it often requires an attorney familiar with substantive and procedural law to secure the right to a
speedy trial, the right to confrontation, and the right to compulsory process. See id. at 705–06.
7. See Martin R. Gardner, The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and Its Underlying Values:
Defining the Scope of Privacy Protection, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 399 (2000) (“The most
prominent value bottoming the Sixth Amendment right to counsel provision is the concern for providing
fair trials for criminal defendants. The cases seek to protect the fairness value not only during the actual
trial but also under certain circumstances during the pretrial phase.”).
8. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
9. Id. at 71. The Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was applicable to the States
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 66–68.
10. Id.
11. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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in all cases in which they face imprisonment are entitled to counsel at state expense
as a matter of fairness. 12 The Court stated:
[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court,
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial
unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an
obvious truth. Governments, both state and federal, quite properly
spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try
defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are
everywhere deemed essential to protect the public’s interest in an
orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with
crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get
to prepare and present their defenses. That government hires
lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire
lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread
belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not
luxuries. . . . From the very beginning, our state and national
constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and
substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before
impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before
the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man
charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to
assist him. 13
In essence, the Court recognized that it is unfair to require an untrained
defendant to engage in an unequal legal contest with the State. 14
The Supreme Court extended the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to
certain pretrial situations in Massiah v. United States. 15 The Court held that
deliberately eliciting incriminating statements from a defendant outside the presence
of his counsel violates the Sixth Amendment and the statements are not admissible
at trial. 16 In arriving at this decision, the Court indicated that this elicitation of
statements in the absence of counsel “contravenes the basic dictates of fairness in the
conduct of criminal causes and the fundamental rights of persons charged with
crime.” 17
The Supreme Court examined direct interference with the right to counsel
in Geders v. United States. 18 In that case, the trial court had issued an order
preventing a defendant from counseling with his attorney about anything during a
seventeen-hour overnight recess between his direct and cross-examination. 19 The
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 344.
Id.
Gardner, supra note 7, at 400.
377 U.S. 201 (1964).
Id. at 205–06.
Id. at 205 (citation omitted).
425 U.S. 80 (1976).
Id. at 82–83.
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Court held that this order violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. 20 In so holding, the Court invoked basic notions of fairness:
Our cases recognize that the role of counsel is important precisely
because ordinarily a defendant is ill-equipped to understand and
deal with the trial process without a lawyer’s guidance.
“The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. . . . [A
defendant] is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. . . . He lacks
both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense,
even though he [may] have a perfect one. He requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.” 21
The common thread in all of these cases is that the purpose of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is to promote fair trials. Any interference with that right
must be closely examined to determine its effect on fairness.
III. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
“The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential
communications known to the common law.” 22 Indeed, the privilege has been
recognized in the English common law since the sixteenth century and was
functioning in American law at the time of the founding. 23 In general, the privilege
is as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence
(5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7)
from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the
protection be waived. 24
The main rationales for the existence of the attorney-client privilege, much
like those for the right to counsel itself, implicate basic concerns of fairness. These
rationales are:
First the law is complex and in order for members of the society
to comply with it in the management of their affairs and the

20. Id. at 91.
21. Id. at 88–89 (alterations and omissions in original) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–
69 (1932)).
22. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
23. Eric D. McArthur, The Search and Seizure of Privileged Attorney-Client Communications, 72 U.
CHI. L. REV. 729, 734 (2005) (citations omitted).
24. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292 (McNaughton rev.
1961) (emphasis omitted).
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settlement of their disputes they require the assistance of expert
lawyers. Second, lawyers are unable to discharge this function
without the fullest possible knowledge of the facts of the client’s
situation. And last, the client cannot be expected to place the
lawyer in full possession of the facts without the assurance that
the lawyer cannot be compelled, over the client’s objection, to
reveal the confidences in court. 25
While the attorney-client privilege “has not been elevated to the level of a
constitutional right,” it “is key to the constitutional guarantees of the right to effective
assistance of counsel and a fair trial.” 26
Of course, the attorney-client privilege is not unlimited. For instance, the
privilege is subject to the crime-fraud exception which applies when an attorneyclient communication takes place in order to further a crime or fraud. 27 “Since the
policy of the privilege is that of promoting the administration of justice, it would be
a perversion of the privilege to extend it to the client who seeks advice to aid him in
carrying out an illegal or fraudulent scheme.” 28 Indeed, “[a]dvice given for those
purposes would not be a professional service but participation in a conspiracy.” 29
Another exception prevents federal government attorneys from asserting “attorneyclient privilege before a federal grand jury if communications with the client contain
information pertinent to possible criminal violations.” 30 Essentially, basic notions of
fairness dictate that the privilege be limited in situations where the reasons for the
privilege are outweighed by a greater public good.
IV. WEATHERFORD V. BURSEY
Weatherford was a civil rights action that began when Brett Allen Bursey
filed suit against Jack M. Weatherford 31 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 32 Weatherford, in
his capacity as an undercover officer, participated with Bursey and others in

25. 1 CHARLES MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87 (Kenneth S. Broun et al. eds., 7th ed.
2013).
26. United States v. Neill, 952 F. Supp. 834, 839 (D.D.C. 1997) (citations omitted).
27. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (“The privilege takes flight if the relation is
abused. A client who consults an attorney for advice that will serve him in the commission of a fraud will
have no help from the law.”).
28. CHARLES MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §95 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 5th ed.
1999).
29. Id.
30. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). This is because allowing
“any part of the federal government to use its in-house attorneys as a shield against the production of
information relevant to a federal criminal investigation would represent a gross misuse of public assets.”
Id. (citation omitted).
31. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 547 (1977).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
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vandalizing a selective service office. 33 Weatherford reported the incident to the
police, and Weatherford was arrested and charged along with Bursey in order to
maintain his undercover status. 34 Bursey hired a defense attorney, and Weatherford
was invited to attend two meetings between Bursey and the attorney “in an effort to
obtain information, ideas or suggestions as to [Bursey]’s defense.” 35 Weatherford
did not seek information from Bursey or the attorney during the meetings, and he
repeatedly advised them that he would seek to sever his case from Bursey’s. 36
Although he attended the meetings in order to preserve his undercover status,
Weatherford did not reveal “any details or information regarding [Bursey]’s trial
plans, strategy, or anything having to do with the criminal action pending against”
Bursey to his superiors or the prosecutor. 37
By the time of Bursey’s trial, Weatherford’s undercover status had been
compromised, so the prosecutor called him as a witness. 38 Weatherford testified and
gave an eyewitness account of Bursey’s acts of vandalism. 39 Bursey was convicted
and disappeared for two years until he was caught and incarcerated for his sentence. 40
Bursey then filed his Section 1983 action for monetary damages against
Weatherford, alleging that Weatherford had violated his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel by sharing defense plans and strategies with the government. 41
The district court denied Bursey’s claim because no information about his
defense had been passed on to the government. 42 The Fourth Circuit reversed the
trial court’s decision and concluded that Bursey’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel
had been violated. 43 The court held that even though the government had learned
nothing from Weatherford about the defense tactics, the rule should be that
“whenever the prosecution knowingly arranges and permits intrusion into the
attorney-client relationship the right to counsel is sufficiently endangered to require
reversal and a new trial.” 44
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and found that Bursey’s
Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not been violated. 45 In doing so, the Court
held that the “per se rule” of the Fourth Circuit’s decision “cuts much too broadly.” 46
The Court focused on two factors in finding that Bursey’s Sixth Amendment right to
counsel had not been violated, For the first factor, the Court focused on the fact that
no attorney-client communications had been revealed to the government:

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

429 U.S. at 547.
Id.
Id. at 547–48.
Id. at 548.
Id.
Id. at 549.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 548–49.
Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483, 486 (4th Cir. 1975), rev’d, 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
Id.
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 558–59 (1977).
Id. at 557.
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Had Weatherford testified at Bursey’s trial as to the conversation
between Bursey and [Bursey’s attorney]; had any of the State’s
evidence originated in these conversations; had those overheard
conversations been used in any other way to the substantial
detriment of Bursey; or even had the prosecution learned from
Weatherford, an undercover agent, the details of the Bursey[attorney] conversations about trial preparations, Bursey would
have a much stronger case. 47
For the second factor, the Court focused on the fact that intrusion into the attorneyclient conversations was not of purposeful design:
Moreover, this is not a situation where the State’s purpose was to
learn what it could about the defendant’s defense plans and the
informant was instructed to intrude on the lawyer-client
relationship or where the informant has assumed for himself that
task and acted accordingly. Weatherford . . . did not intrude at all;
he was invited to the meeting, apparently not for his benefit but
for the benefit of Bursey and his lawyer. . . . Weatherford went,
not to spy, but because he was asked and because the State was
interested in retaining his undercover services on other matters
and it was therefore necessary to avoid raising the suspicion that
he was in fact the informant whose existence Bursey and [his
attorney] already suspected. 48
Essentially, the Court’s ruling was based on fairness grounds. In the absence of a
deliberate intrusion into attorney-client communications and/or a revelation of
defense strategy to the prosecution, it would be unfair to vacate a criminal conviction.
The Weatherford decisions leaves some questions unanswered. For
instance, what if the government purposefully intrudes into attorney-client
communications in bad faith? Is this a violation of the Sixth Amendment, or must
there still be a showing of prejudice? If a showing of prejudice is required, who bears
the burden?
V. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Given Weatherford’s unanswered questions, it is not surprising that the
lower courts have developed inconsistent rules for determining when an intrusion
into attorney-client conversations amounts to a Sixth Amendment violation. The
lower courts have also developed inconsistent rules about whether a showing of
prejudice is required.

47. Id. at 554.
48. Id. at 557.
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A. First Circuit
The First Circuit examined the issue of government intrusion into attorneyclient communications in United States v. Mastroianni. 49 A number of defendants
were convicted of conspiracy charges in that case, and two defendants claimed on
appeal that their rights to effective assistance of counsel were violated. 50 After the
police had searched the property of the defendants, one defendant asked a
government informant whom he thought was a co-conspirator to attend a meeting
with the attorneys for the two defendants, as well as all of the defendants. 51 The
informant consulted with the authorities, and the prosecutor authorized the
informant’s attendance at the meeting in order to avoid risk to the informant’s safety
and to protect his cover. 52 At a debriefing after the meeting, the informant relayed
confidential communications to the government but the information was not used by
the government. 53
The First Circuit began its analysis by noting that, like Weatherford, this
was not a case in which the government “deliberately intruded into the defense
camp.” 54 However, the court held that even in the context of an intentional intrusion
lacking any justification, “[a] Sixth Amendment violation cannot be established
without a showing that there is a realistic possibility of injury to defendants or benefit
to the State as a result of the government’s intrusion into the attorney-client
relationship.” 55 Because “there are certain circumstances in which the revelation of
confidential communications by the informant is harmless,” defendants must “make
a prima facie showing of prejudice” by proving “that confidential communications
were conveyed as a result of the presence of a government informant at a defense
meeting.” 56 If a defendant offers this prima facie proof, “the burden shifts to the
government to show that there has been and there will be no prejudice to the
defendants as a result of these communications.” 57 Because the government had
clearly demonstrated that it did not use any information that came from the
informant, there was no prejudice and thus, no violation of the Sixth Amendment. 58

49. 749 F.2d 900 (1st Cir. 1984).
50. Id. at 904.
51. Id. at 903.
52. Id. at 904.
53. Id. at 905.
54. Id. The court stated that “the government bears the burden of proving the necessity for its
representative to attend meetings between defendants and their attorneys” and “preservation of an
informant’s cover and safety is a permissible rationale for an informant’s attendance at a defense meeting.”
Id. at 906.
55. Id. at 907 (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also United States v. DeCologero, 530
F.3d 36, 64 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[T]he government’s intrusion into the attorney-client relationship is not a
per se Sixth Amendment violation; there must also be some demonstration of resulting prejudice.”)
(citation omitted).
56. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d at 907–08 (citations omitted).
57. Id. at 908 (“The burden on the government is high because to require anything less would be to
condone intrusions into a defendant’s protected attorney-client communications.”).
58. Id.
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B. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit examined the issue of government intrusion into
attorney-client communications in United States v. Ginsberg, in which the defendant
was convicted of conspiracy charges. 59 The defendant argued on appeal that his right
to counsel had been violated when the government concealed the fact that a supposed
co-defendant was actually an informant, which allowed the informant to sit at the
defense table during court conferences. 60
The court stated that although government interferences in the attorneyclient relationship may violate the right to effective assistance of counsel, assuming
that the government does not deliberately interfere in the relationship between
defendant and counsel, the mere presence of a government agent, informant, or
cooperating witness at conferences between defendant and counsel does not violate
the sixth amendment. 61 The court held that when the intrusion into attorney-client
communications is unintentional or justified, there is no Sixth Amendment violation
“without some communication of valuable information derived from the intrusion to
the government: absent such communication, there exists no realistic possibility of
either prejudice to the defense or benefit to the government” 62 When the intrusion is
unintentional or justified, the defendant has the burden to show that confidential
information was conveyed to the government and that prejudice resulted. 63 The court
held that the defendant had failed to meet that burden. 64
C. Third Circuit
The Third Circuit examined the issue of government intrusion into attorneyclient communications in United States v. Costanzo, in which the defendant appealed
his conviction for conspiracy to possess and possession of stolen treasury checks. 65
The defendant claimed that his right to counsel was violated because his attorney had
been acting as an informant and was disclosing confidential attorney-client
conversations to the FBI. 66
The Third Circuit began its analysis by stating that the rule for government
intrusions into attorney-client communications is that:
The sixth amendment is . . . violated when the government (1)
intentionally plants an informer in the defense camp; (2) when
confidential defense strategy information is disclosed to the
prosecution by a government informer; or (3) when there is no

59. 758 F.2d 823, 825 (2d Cir. 1984).
60. Id. at 832.
61. Id. at 833 (citations omitted).
62. Id. (citations omitted).
63. Id.; see also United States v. Simels, 654 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that the defendant
had not established a Sixth Amendment violation because there was no claim that privileged information
was passed to the government or that prejudice resulted from contact between the informant and the
attorney).
64. Ginsberg, 758 F.2d at 833–34.
65. 740 F.2d 251, 254 (3d Cir. 1984).
66. Id.
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intentional intrusion or disclosure of confidential defense
strategy, but a disclosure by a government informer leads to
prejudice to the defendant. 67
Significantly, the Third Circuit’s rule is that intentional intrusions by the government
are a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment. 68 The court then held that there had
been no purposeful intrusion because the attorney did not represent the defendant in
the criminal case and their dealings were of a business nature, including a scheme to
defraud a bank. 69 In addition, the court determined that none of the disclosures
involved confidential defense strategy or were prejudicial and thus, there was no
Sixth Amendment violation. 70
D. Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit examined the issue of government intrusion into
attorney-client communications in United States v. Brugman, in which two
defendants were convicted of distributing cocaine. 71 The two defendants claimed on
appeal that their Sixth Amendment rights to counsel were violated when their codefendant pleaded guilty after five days of trial pursuant to a plea agreement which
required him to testify against them. 72 The testifying co-defendant had attended a
joint meeting with the defendants and their attorneys during the course of the trial. 73
The Fourth Circuit began its analysis by noting that there is no “per se rule
that whenever conversations with counsel are overheard the Sixth Amendment is
violated.” 74 Instead, the court stated:
In determining whether there has been an invasion such as to be
violative of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel, four factors must be considered. They include: (1)
whether the presence of the informant was purposely caused by
the government in order to garner confidential, privileged
information, or whether the presence of the informant was a result
of other inadvertent occurrences; (2) whether the government
obtained, directly or indirectly, any evidence which was used at
trial as a result of the informant’s intrusion; (3) whether any other
information gained by the informant’s intrusion was used in any
other manner to the substantial detriment of the defendant; and

67. Id. (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977)).
68. Id.; see also United States v. Levy, 557 F.2d 200, 208 (3d Cir. 1978) (“Where there is a knowing
invasion of the attorney-client relationship and where confidential information is disclosed to the
government, we think that there are overwhelming considerations militating against a standard which tests
the sixth amendment violation by weighing how prejudicial to the defense the disclosure is.”).
69. Costanzo, 740 F.2d at 254–55.
70. Id. at 255–57.
71. 655 F.2d 540, 541–42 (4th Cir. 1981).
72. Id. at 541–42.
73. Id. at 545.
74. Id. at 546.
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finally, (4) whether the details about trial preparation were learned
by the government. 75
The court did not explain whether these factors are to be considered in totality, but
seemed to imply that each factor by itself could be enough to support a Sixth
Amendment violation. There was no need for the court to provide this explanation
because it held that there was no Sixth Amendment violation because none of the
factors were present in the case. 76
E. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit examined potential remedies for government intrusion
into attorney-client communications in United States v. Melvin. 77 In that case, the
district court had dismissed the indictment for conspiracy charges as a sanction for
what the court viewed as a government intrusion into the attorney client
relationship. 78 The government appealed, and the Fifth Circuit reversed. 79
After being arrested, Charles Powell and several others were charged with
a conspiracy to import marijuana. 80 Powell agreed to cooperate with the prosecution
against his co-conspirators in exchange for a reduction in charges. 81 One of the
defendants subsequently invited Powell to attend a meeting with three attorneys and
two defendants. 82 The attorneys questioned Powell about his knowledge of the case
and discussed some trial strategy. 83 After this meeting, Powell met with the lead
attorney a number of times, and he was debriefed after each meeting. 84
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by holding that there is no per se rule
that requires dismissal of a case anytime there is a government intrusion into
attorney-client communications. 85 Rather, the court stated that the trial court should
not have dismissed the case “without first finding that the intrusion into appellees’
attorney-client relationship prejudiced the ability of their attorneys to provide
adequate representation or otherwise prejudiced their defense.” 86 The court also
stated that even if there was prejudice, courts should not automatically dismiss a
case, but should “determine whether some remedy short of dismissal— e. g.,

75. Id.
76. Id. Specifically, the court found that (1) the co-defendant’s presence at the defense meeting was
not induced or encouraged by the government, (2) the government did not use the information, (3) the
information did not prejudice the defendants, and (4) the prosecution did not learn details about trial
preparation.
77. 650 F.2d 641, 642 (5th Cir. 1981).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 642–43.
83. Id. at 643.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 644. The court did not expressly state which party had the burden of showing that there was
or was not prejudice, but the court stated in United States v. Kilrain, 566 F.2d 979, 983 (5th Cir. 1978),
that the burden is on defendants to demonstrate prejudice.
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suppression—can be tailored to vindicate the appellees’ Sixth Amendment rights to
counsel and a fair trial and, at the same time, protect the public’s interest in seeing
that the guilty are brought to justice.” 87
The court then went on to state that Powell’s presence at the defense
meetings did not necessarily constitute an intrusion into a confidential relationship
because disclosures made in the presence of third parties may not carry any
reasonable expectation that they remain private. 88 The court held that:
there is no governmental intrusion into the attorney-client
relationship in violation of the Sixth Amendment when a
confidential informant attends a meeting of other defendants and
their counsel, at the request of other defendants and their attorneys,
under such circumstances that the informant could not reasonably
refuse to attend without jeopardizing his undercover status, and
under circumstances indicating that the other defendants and their
counsel knew or should have known that the informant was not part
of the defense team and knew or should have known that there was
no reasonable expectation of confidentiality in the presence of the
informant. 89
F. Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit examined the issue of government intrusion into attorneyclient communications in United States v. Steele, in which four defendants were
convicted of various conspiracy charges. 90 The defendants claimed on appeal that
their rights to effective assistance of counsel were violated when government
informants “invaded the defense camp and were privy to attorney-client
communications and trial strategies.” 91 Specifically, the defendants contended that
when they were incarcerated with one of the informants before trial, the informant
repeatedly tried to get in close proximity to one of the defendants when he was
discussing the case with his attorney. 92 The defendants also argued that their rights
were violated because a defense investigator was acting as an informant for the FBI
in another case and “possibly” relayed information about defense tactics in this case
to the government. 93
The court began its analysis by stating that in order to determine whether
an intrusion into attorney-client communications constitutes a Sixth Amendment
violation, courts must examine:
1) whether the presence of the informant was purposely caused by
the government in order to garner confidential, privileged

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Melvin, 650 F.2d at 644.
Id. at 645.
Id. at 646.
727 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 585.
Id. at 586.
Id. at 587.
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information, or whether the presence of the informant was the
result of other inadvertent occurrences; 2) whether the
government obtained, directly or indirectly, any evidence which
was used at trial as the result of the informant’s intrusion; 3)
whether any information gained by the informant’s intrusion was
used in any other manner to the substantial detriment of the
defendant; and 4) whether the details about trial preparations were
learned by the government. 94
The court then adopted a rule that, “[e]ven where there is an intentional intrusion by
the government into the attorney-client relationship, prejudice to the defendant must
be shown before any remedy is granted.” 95 The court also made it clear that the
burden is on the defense to show prejudice from the intrusion. 96 Because the
defendants had failed to show any prejudice, their convictions were affirmed. 97
G. Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit examined the issue of government intrusion into
attorney-client communications in United States v. Castor, in which the defendant
was convicted of extortion and firearm charges. 98 On appeal, the defendant argued
that the district court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss because his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel was violated when a defense attorney discussed the case
with an FBI agent with whom she had a relationship. 99
The court began its analysis by noting that the FBI had indicated that it
would not call the agent as a witness. 100 The court also noted that the defendant could
not show prejudice because there was no proof that any information about him had
been passed from the defense investigator to the FBI agent. 101 The court then stated
that “[w]ithout any proof of governmental intrusion or actual prejudice, the
defendant cannot assert that the mere relationship of an investigator working for his
attorney with an FBI agent assigned to the case violates his constitutional right to
counsel.” 102
The holding in Castor implies that prejudice does not have to be shown if
the intrusion into attorney-client communications is intentional. The Seventh Circuit
subsequently stated that although the general rule is that the defendant must show
prejudice in order to establish a Sixth Amendment violation, prejudice may not have
94. Id. at 585 (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977)).
95. Id. at 586 (citation omitted).
96. Id. at 586–87.
97. Id. at 587; see also Sinclair v. Schriber, 916 F.2d 1109, 1112 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[I]n order to
establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel ensuing from government surveillance, a
claimant must not only show that conversations with an attorney were surreptiously [sic] monitored, but
must also show that the information gained was used to prejudice the claimant’s defense in his criminal
trial.”).
98. 937 F.2d 293, 295 (7th Cir. 1991).
99. Id. at 297.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 297–98.
102. Id. at 298 (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977)).
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to be shown in cases of continuous surveillance of conversations by the government
where knowledge of the surveillance would make a defendant reluctant to make
candid disclosures to his attorney. 103
H. Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit examined the issue of government intrusion into
attorney-client communications in United States v. Singer, in which the defendant
had his convictions for various conspiracy charges reversed on appeal and was
convicted again after retrial. 104 The defendant argued that his Sixth Amendment right
to counsel was violated because the government had received and reviewed fifty-six
confidential documents from his attorney’s file prior to the retrial of the case. 105
Specifically, an employee at the defense attorney’s office, who was not connected
with law enforcement in any way, had photocopied the confidential file after the first
trial and provided it to a co-defendant who was acting as a government informant. 106
The informant then provided the file to a police sergeant as proof that the defendant’s
father had committed perjury at the first trial with approval of the defense attorney. 107
The Eighth Circuit began its analysis by stating that in order to establish a
violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant has the burden of showing: “first,
that the government knowingly intruded into the attorney-client relationship; and
second, that the intrusion demonstrably prejudiced the defendant, or created a
substantial threat of prejudice.” 108 The court also stated that even when there has
been a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a case should not necessarily be dismissed
because, “[t]he interests supporting the sixth amendment right, meant to assure
fairness in the adversary criminal process, must be reconciled with society’s
competing interest in prosecuting criminal conduct.” 109 Instead, the trial court should
“tailor a remedy to the injury suffered, to assure the defendant effective assistance of
counsel in a subsequent proceeding.” 110
The court agreed that there was a Sixth Amendment violation when the
confidential file was viewed by the informant and sergeant, who both testified in the
retrial, and by the prosecution, because there was a threat of prejudice during the
retrial. 111 However, the court upheld the convictions because the testimony of the

103. United States v. DiDomenico, 78 F.3d 294, 299 (7th Cir. 1996). The court did not definitively
decide the issue because it was unnecessary to do so under the particular posture of the case. Id. at 299–
301.
104. 785 F.2d 228, 229–30 (8th Cir. 1986).
105. Id. at 230.
106. Id. at 231.
107. Id. at 230–31.
108. Id. at 234 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Tyerman, 701 F.3d 552, 559 (8th Cir.
2012) (“To establish a Sixth Amendment claim based on violation of the attorney-client privilege, this
court requires the defendant to prove that the government knowingly intruded into the attorney-client
relationship.”) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
109. Singer, 785 F.2d at 234 (citation omitted).
110. Id. at 234–35 (citation omitted).
111. Id. at 235.
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sergeant and informant at the retrial was not shaped by review of the file and because
none of the prosecutors who had seen the file participated in the retrial. 112
I. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit examined the issue of government intrusion into attorneyclient communications in United States v. Irwin, in which the defendant was
convicted of drug distribution and conspiracy charges. 113 The defendant claimed on
appeal that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated by an undercover
DEA agent who was posing as a large-scale drug dealer. 114 Specifically, after the
defendant was arrested and had counsel appointed, the undercover agent met with
the defendant in the absence of his attorney and encouraged him to act as an
informant in order to secure a favorable disposition of his case. 115
The court began its analysis by rejecting a per se rule that all government
interference with the attorney-client relation is a violation of the Sixth
Amendment. 116 Instead, the court held that:
From Weatherford . . . it is apparent that mere government
intrusion into the attorney-client relationship, although not
condoned by the court, is not itself violative of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. Rather, the right is only violated
when the intrusion substantially prejudices the defendant.
Prejudice can manifest itself in several ways. It results when
evidence gained through the interference is used against the
defendant at trial. It also can result from the prosecution’s use of
confidential information pertaining to the defense plans and
strategy, from government influence which destroys the
defendant’s confidence in his attorney, and from other actions
designed to give the prosecution an unfair advantage at trial. 117
The court found that the defendant was not entitled to relief because there was no
showing of any of these types of prejudice. 118 However, the court did not indicate
who bears the burden of proof of establishing prejudice.
The Ninth Circuit subsequently answered this question in United States v.
Danielson. 119 The court adopted a two-part rule when it comes to the burden of
establishing prejudice. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing of
prejudice by showing that the government informant “acted affirmatively to intrude
into the attorney-client relationship and thereby to obtain the privileged

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 235–36, 244.
612 F.2d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1183–84.
Id. at 1188.
Id. at 1185.
Id. at 1186–87 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1187–91.
325 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2003).

150

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 50; No. 1

information.” 120 If the defendant makes this showing, “the burden shifts to the
government to show that there has been no prejudice to the defendant as a result of
these communications.” 121
J. Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit examined the issue of government intrusion into
attorney-client communications in Shillinger v. Haworth, in which the government
appealed the grant of a petition for habeas relief. 122 The district court granted the
petition after finding that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated by
government intrusion into his trial preparation sessions with his attorney. 123
The defendant was arrested and charged with aggravated assault for an
incident involving an argument over a Milk Bone dog biscuit. 124 As the trial date
approached, the defense attorney arranged to hold trial preparation sessions in the
trial courtroom, which required a deputy sheriff to be present because the defendant
was in custody. 125 After these sessions, the prosecutor initiated a conversation with
the deputy and learned about the substance of the conversations that took place
between the defendant and his attorney. 126 During cross-examination of the
defendant at trial, the prosecutor asked whether he had specifically used the word
“cut” instead of “stabbed.” 127 The prosecutor also stated in closing argument that the
defendant was the only witness who had practiced his testimony. 128
The Tenth Circuit began by stating that the case did not involve the “state’s
interest in effective law enforcement,” but was instead a purposeful intrusion for the
purpose of learning the substance of the defendant’s conversations with his
attorney. 129 The court then stated:
We necessarily recognize the right to counsel in order to secure
the fundamental right to a fair trial guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It follows that the
“benchmark” of a Sixth Amendment claim is “the fairness of the
adversary proceeding.” The Supreme Court has therefore declared
that “[a]bsent some effect of challenged conduct on the reliability
of the trial process, the Sixth Amendment guarantee is generally
not implicated.” At the same time, however, “[i]n certain Sixth
Amendment contexts, prejudice is presumed.” This is particularly

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 1071.
Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted).
70 F.3d 1132, 1134 (10th Cir. 1995).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1134–35.
Id. at 1135.
Id. at 1135–36.
Id. at 1141.
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true with regard to “various kinds of state interference with
counsel’s assistance.” 130
In light of the above principals regarding fairness, the court adopted a rule that an
intentional intrusion into attorney-client communications, without a countervailing
state interest, is a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment. 131
In other words, we hold that when the state becomes privy to
confidential communications because of its purposeful intrusion
into the attorney-client relationship and lacks a legitimate
justification for doing so, a prejudicial effect on the reliability of
the trial process must be presumed. In adopting this rule, we
conclude that no other standard can adequately deter this sort of
misconduct. We also note that prejudice in these circumstances is
so likely that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the
cost. 132
The court did note, however, that its per se rule did not apply to situations “in which
the state has a legitimate law enforcement purpose for its intrusion.” 133 In that
situation, there would need to be proof of prejudice in order to constitute a Sixth
Amendment violation. 134
K. Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit examined the issue of government intrusion into
attorney-client communications in United States v. Ofshe, in which the defendant
entered a conditional guilty plea to drug charges. 135 The defendant argued on appeal
that his conviction should be reversed because the government used his defense
attorney as an informant. 136
After he was hired as co-counsel, one of the defendant’s attorneys learned
that he was a target of a public corruption investigation. 137 In order to diminish his
own criminal responsibility, the attorney offered to act as an informant for the
government in drug trafficking investigations. 138 The government subsequently
placed a body bug on the attorney in order to conduct surveillance on conversations
between the defendant and the attorney about future money laundering and drug

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
Id. at 1142.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977)).
Id.
817 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1515.
Id. at 1511.
Id.
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transactions. 139 The monitored conversations included discussion of the timing of
and likelihood of success of a motion to suppress in the pending case. 140
The Eleventh Circuit held that “absent demonstrable prejudice,” dismissal
of a case is an inappropriate remedy for a Sixth Amendment violation. 141 The court
then held that the defendant was not prejudiced because the “taped conversation
produced no tainted evidence, . . . the intrusion into any potentially privileged
attorney-client matters was not purposeful,” and “no information was provided to the
prosecuting attorney.” 142
L. District of Columbia Circuit
The District of Columbia Circuit examined the issue of government
intrusion into attorney-client communications in United States v. Kelly, in which a
former congressman was convicted of bribery and other charges. 143 The defendant
filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. 144 The defendant
argued on appeal that he was entitled to a new trial because an informant had met
with the defendant and his attorney, had discussed trial strategy with them, and had
stolen defense documents that he passed on to a second informant to sell to the
FBI. 145
On appeal, the defendant argued that he was not required to show any
prejudice resulted from the intrusion, while the government argued that the defendant
had a high burden of showing that he would probably be acquitted during a new
trial. 146 The court stated that both parties had “missed the legal mark as to the
applicable legal standards.” 147 The court held that under Weatherford, some
prejudice must be shown, but it need not be to the level of proving that a new trial
would probably result in an acquittal. 148 Instead, courts should examine the following
factors to determine whether a violation of the Sixth Amendment has occurred:
(1) was evidence used at trial produced directly or indirectly by
the intrusion; (2) was the intrusion by the government intentional;
(3) did the prosecution receive otherwise confidential information
about trial preparations or defense strategy as a result of the
intrusion; and (4) were the overheard conversations and other

139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1515 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Deluca, 663 Fed. Appx. 875, 878 (11th
Cir. 2016) (“[F]or the sanction of dismissal to be appropriate, a showing of ‘demonstrable prejudice, or
substantial threat thereof,’ must be made, even in cases where the violation is a deliberate intrusion.”)
(citation omitted).
142. Ofshe, 817 F.2d at 1515.
143. 790 F.2d 130, 132, 136–38 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
144. Id. at 132.
145. Id. at 133.
146. Id. at 136.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 137.
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information used in any other way to the substantial detriment of
the defendant? 149
The court did not address “what combination of these factors is necessary
to” establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment. 150 However, the court did hold that
the defendant had the burden to demonstrate “sufficient prejudice to establish a sixth
amendment violation.” 151 If the defendant establishes prejudice, the burden then
shifts to the government to “defeat the new trial motion by showing that the
constitutional violation was harmless error” by proving “beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” 152
M. Summary of the Circuit Split
There is a significant split in authority in the circuit courts about whether a
showing of prejudice is necessary, and if it is, who bears the burden. The First, 153
Fifth, 154 Sixth, 155 Eighth, 156 Ninth, 157 Eleventh, 158 and D.C. 159 Circuits require a
showing of prejudice and place the burden on the defendant. The Second, 160
Fourth, 161 and Seventh 162 Circuits have recognized that intentional intrusions may
not require a showing of prejudice, but have not specifically decided. The Third 163
and Tenth 164 Circuits have determined that intentional intrusions are per se violations
of the Sixth Amendment that do not require a showing of prejudice by the defendant
in most circumstances.
VI. POST-WEATHERFORD
Which set of rules from which circuit is correct? The Supreme Court should
remedy this split of authority in order to end this location-based set of rules. Criminal
activity and the need to investigate it exists in every jurisdiction, and many crimes
and investigations will involve multiple jurisdictions. As technology and mobility
increase, so will multi-jurisdictional crimes and investigations.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554, 557 (1977)).
Id. at 137.
Id. at 138.
Id. (citation omitted).
United States v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d 900, 907–08 (1st Cir. 1984).
United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641, 644 (5th Cir. 1981).
United States v. Steele, 727 F.2d 580, 586 (6th Cir. 1984).
United States v. Singer, 785 F.2d 228, 234 (8th Cir. 1986).
United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182, 1186–89 (9th Cir. 1980).
United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508, 1515 (11th Cir. 1987).
United States v. Kelly, 790 F.2d 139, 137 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
United States v. Ginsberg, 758 F.2d 823, 833 (2d Cir. 1985).
United States v. Brugman, 655 F.2d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 1981).
United States v. Castor, 937 F.2d 293, 298 (7th Cir. 1991).
United States v. Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251, 254 (3d Cir.1984).
Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F.3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir. 1996).
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The Supreme Court’s pre-Weatherford cases indicate that fairness is the
basic principle behind the right to counsel. 165 Although the Court has not addressed
intrusion into attorney-client communications since Weatherford, an examination of
the Court’s post-Weatherford cases involving interference with attorney-client
relationships indicates that fairness remains the guiding principle. 166
A. United States v. Morrison
In United States v. Morrison, 167 the Supreme Court was confronted with the
question of what is the appropriate remedy for an interference with the attorneyclient relationship that amounts to a violation of the Sixth Amendment. In that case,
two DEA agents met with a defendant who had been indicted for drug crimes without
the knowledge or permission of her retained counsel. 168 During the conversation
about the potential of cooperation in a related investigation, the agents “disparaged”
defense counsel and suggested that the defendant would be better off if she was
represented by a public defender. 169 The defendant rejected the offer to cooperate
and continued to rely on the advice of her attorney. 170 The defendant subsequently
moved to dismiss the case with prejudice by arguing that the agents had violated her
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 171
The Supreme Court assumed, but did not decide, that there had been a Sixth
Amendment violation. 172 It was not necessary for the Court to decide whether there
had been a violation, because even if there had been, the defendant was not entitled
to a dismissal. 173 The Court began its analysis by stating that the right to counsel “is
meant to assure fairness in the adversary criminal process.” 174 In addition, the Court
“recognized the necessity for preserving society’s interest in the administration of
criminal justice.” 175 Thus, cases involving violations of the Sixth Amendment are
“subject to the general rule that remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered
from the constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing
interests.” 176
In light of this general rule, the court held that “absent demonstrable
prejudice, or substantial threat thereof, dismissal of the indictment is plainly
inappropriate, even though the violation may have been deliberate.” 177 Because there
had been no prejudice, there had been no unfairness, and thus, there was no need for
a remedy.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

See supra notes 4–21 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 166–221 and accompanying text.
449 U.S. 361 (1981).
Id. at 362.
Id.
Id. at 362–63.
Id. at 363.
Id. at 364.
Id. at 367.
Id. at 364 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 365.
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B. Inmate Informer Cases
The Supreme Court addressed situations in which inmates alert the
government about incriminating statements made by fellow inmates in United States
v. Henry 178 and Kuhlmann v. Wilson. 179 The decisions in both cases came down to
basic notions of fairness.
In Henry, the defendant was incarcerated with an inmate who had been
acting as a paid informant for the FBI for some time. 180 After the informant was
released from custody, he reported to the FBI that the defendant had made several
incriminating statements. 181 The informant was paid for this information, and he
testified about it at trial although the fact that he was an informant was not disclosed
to the jury. 182 The Supreme Court held that the admission of this testimony violated
the Sixth Amendment because by using an inmate informer to engage in
conversations with the defendant and paying him only if he produced useful
information, the government had “intentionally creat[ed] a situation likely to induce
[the defendant] to make incriminating statements without the assistance of
counsel.” 183 Essentially, the Court’s holding reflects a recognition that it was unfair
to allow the government to benefit by using the improperly obtained incriminating
statements against the defendant at trial. Fairness required the testimony to be
suppressed.
In contrast, the inmate informer in Kuhlmann was merely a passive listener
who asked no questions of the defendant, but merely listened to and made notes about
the defendant’s “spontaneous and unsolicited” incriminating statements. 184 The
Court held that the informant’s testimony about the incriminating statements did not
violate the Sixth Amendment because:
the Sixth Amendment is not violated whenever—by luck or
happenstance—the State obtains incriminating statements from
the accused after the right to counsel has attached, a defendant
does not make out a violation of that right simply by showing that
an informant, either through prior arrangement or voluntarily,
reported his incriminating statements to the police. Rather, the
defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant
took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed
deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks. 185
Because there was no government action beyond simply listening to a talkative
defendant, there was nothing unfair about the admission of the informant’s
testimony.

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

447 U.S. 264 (1980).
477 U.S. 436 (1986).
447 U.S. at 266.
Id.
Id. at 266–67.
Id. at 270–71, 274.
477 U.S. at 440.
Id. at 459 (internal quotations omitted).
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C. Deliberate Elicitation Cases
The Supreme Court addressed situations in which the government
deliberately elicited statements from defendants in the absence of their counsel in
Brewer v. Williams 186 and Maine v. Moulton. 187 The decisions in these cases came
down to basic notions of fairness.
In Brewer, a detective obtained incriminating statements from a defendant
after the defendant had obtained counsel and invoked his right to remain silent and
the detective had promised the attorney that he would not question the defendant
while he was being transported in a police car. 188 During the several-hour trip, the
detective, who suspected that Williams had murdered a ten-year-old girl several days
earlier, and the defendant engaged in conversation about religion. 189 The detective,
who knew the defendant was a deeply religious man who had recently escaped from
a mental institution, asked the defendant to think about the plight of the family of the
dead girl, whose body had not been found, who were unable to see their loved one
receive a proper “Christian burial.” 190 The defendant then made incriminating
statements and directed the police to the body. 191
The Court began its analysis by stating that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel “is indispensable to the fair administration of our adversary system of
criminal justice.” 192 The Court then found that there was no doubt that the detective
“deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information from [the defendant] just as
surely as—and perhaps more effectively than—if he had formally interrogated
him.” 193 Thus, the Court held that the admission of the evidence obtained from the
deliberate elicitation of statements was a violation of the Sixth Amendment. 194
A similar result occurred in Moulton for similar reasons. In that case, the
defendant and co-defendant were indicted and released on bail after they retained
counsel. 195 The co-defendant subsequently agreed to cooperate with the police, and
met with the defendant while equipped with a body wire. 196 During the recorded
conversation, the co-defendant frequently claimed that he could not remember the
events at issue and he repeatedly asked the defendant to remind him of the details,
which caused the defendant to make numerous incriminating statements. 197 The
statements were later introduced at trial. 198
The Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that, “[t]he right to the
assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments is
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430 U.S. 387 (1977).
474 U.S. 159 (1985).
430 U.S. at 391–93.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 392–93.
Id. at 393.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 406.
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 162 (1985).
Id. at 164.
Id. at 165–66.
Id. at 166.

Winter 2020

UNSETTLED WEATHER

157

indispensable to the fair administration of our adversarial system of criminal justice”
and “the right to counsel safeguards the other rights deemed essential for the fair
prosecution of a criminal proceeding.” 199 The Court then applied these principles of
fairness to hold that the Sixth Amendment was violated when the government
introduced the defendant’s incriminating statements into evidence at trial that it
obtained by knowingly circumventing the right to counsel. 200
D. Nix v. Williams
After the defendant in Brewer v. Williams had his conviction reversed
because of the admission of his incriminating statements, he was retried and was
convicted again. The Supreme Court had the opportunity to review the second trial
in Nix v. Williams. 201
In the retrial, the prosecution did not introduce the defendant’s statements
into evidence and it did not introduce evidence that the defendant directed the police
to the child’s body. 202 However, the prosecution did introduce evidence about the
condition of the body and the results of medical and chemical tests performed on the
body. 203 The defendant argued on appeal that the trial court should have suppressed
this evidence because it was a product of the Sixth Amendment violation of his right
to counsel. 204
The central question in the case was whether the evidence about the body
and its condition was admissible under the inevitable discovery exception to the
exclusionary rule because the body would have been discovered eventually even in
the absence of the Sixth Amendment violation. 205 To answer this question, the Court
engaged in an extensive discussion of fairness. The Court stated:
Exclusion of physical evidence that would inevitably have been
discovered adds nothing to either the integrity or fairness of a
criminal trial. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel protects
against unfairness by preserving the adversary process in which
the reliability of proffered evidence may be tested in crossexamination. Here, however, [the] Detective[‘s] conduct did
nothing to impugn the reliability of the evidence in question—the
body of the child and its condition as it was found, articles of
clothing found on the body, and the autopsy. No one would
seriously contend that the presence of counsel in the police car
when [the detective] appealed to [the defendant’s] decent human
instincts would have had any bearing on the reliability of the body
as evidence. Suppression, in these circumstances, would do
nothing whatever to promote the integrity of the trial process, but
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Id. at 168–69 (citations omitted).
Id. at 176–77.
467 U.S. 431 (1984).
Id. at 437.
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would inflict a wholly unacceptable burden on the administration
of criminal justice. 206
The Court went on to state that suppression would not ensure the fairness of the
adversary system. 207 Rather,
Fairness can be assured by placing the State and the accused in
the same positions they would have been in had the impermissible
conduct not taken place. However, if the government can prove
that the evidence would have been obtained inevitably and,
therefore, would have been admitted regardless of any
overreaching by the police, there is no rational basis to keep that
evidence from the jury in order to ensure the fairness of the trial
proceedings. In that situation, the State has gained no advantage
at trial and the defendant has suffered no prejudice. Indeed,
suppression of the evidence would operate to undermine the
adversary system by putting the State in a worse position than it
would have occupied without any police misconduct. 208
Essentially, the defendant suffered no prejudice by the introduction of evidence that
would have been discovered anyway, so it would be unfair to the government to have
the evidence suppressed.
E. Impeachment Cases
The Supreme Court dealt with the question of whether statements taken in
violation of the Sixth Amendment can be used to impeach a defendant’s trial
testimony in Michigan v. Harvey 209 and Kansas v. Ventris. 210 Both cases were
decided on fairness grounds.
After the defendant in Harvey was charged and had counsel appointed, he
told a police officer that he wanted to make a statement, but he did not know whether
he should talk to his attorney first. 211 The police officer told the defendant he did not
need to speak with his attorney, and the defendant gave a statement. 212 After the
defendant testified at trial, the prosecutor used the defendant’s statement to police to
impeach his inconsistent testimony. 213 The question presented to the Court was
whether this statement, which the government conceded was taken in violation of
the Sixth Amendment, could be introduced to impeach the defendant’s testimony. 214
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Id. at 446–47 (citations omitted).
Id. at 447.
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The Court held that although the prosecution cannot build its case in chief
on evidence obtained from constitutional violations, “use of statements so obtained
for impeachment purposes is a different matter.” 215 Indeed,
If a defendant exercises his right to testify on his own behalf, he
assumes a reciprocal obligation to speak truthfully and accurately,
and we have consistently rejected arguments that would allow a
defendant to turn the illegal method by which evidence in the
Government’s possession was obtained to his own advantage, and
provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his
untruths. 216
Essentially, the Court’s ruling recognizes that it would be unfair to allow a defendant
to commit perjury, without allowing the prosecutor to counter the perjury with the
defendant’s own voluntary statement.
After the defendant in Ventris was charged with murder and other crimes,
police officers planted an informant in his cell. 217 In response to the informant’s
remark that the defendant appeared to having something serious weighing on his
mind, the defendant made an incriminating statement. 218 The prosecution conceded
that the statement was taken in violation of the Sixth Amendment, but argued that
the statement was admissible to impeach the defendant’s inconsistent trial
testimony. 219
The Court began its analysis by noting that its “precedents make clear that
the game of excluding tainted evidence for impeachment purposes is not worth the
candle.” 220 Indeed,
The interests safeguarded by such exclusion are outweighed by
the need to prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of the trial
process. It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make
an affirmative use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite
another to say that the defendant can . . . provide himself with a
shield against contradiction of his untruths. 221
The bottom line is that once the defendant testifies inconsistently with prior
statements, preventing the prosecution from using those statements to impeach the

215. Id. at 351.
216. Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted).
217. Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 589 (2009).
218. Id.
219. Id. The Supreme Court cited Kuhlmann v. Wilson to note that this concession was likely
unnecessary, but stated that the concession was now the law of the case. Id. at 590. The Court also noted
that in regard to uncounseled interrogation of defendants represented by counsel, the constitutional
violation occurs at the time of the interrogation, and not just when evidence is admitted at trial. Id. at 592.
220. Id. at 593.
221. Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
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testimony is too “high [of a] price to pay for vindication of the right to counsel at the
prior stage.” 222
VII. SETTLING THE WEATHER
The failure of the Supreme Court in Weatherford to establish clear rules for
analyzing government intrusion into attorney-client conversations has led to a
confused mixture of rules that depend on where the intrusion occurred. This situation
is untenable in a modern age when crimes and investigations frequently cross
jurisdictional boundaries. Both defendants and law enforcement officials are entitled
to consistent rules.
From Powell to Geders, the Supreme Court’s pre-Weatherford cases have
been consistent in holding that fairness is the guiding principle of the Sixth
Amendment. 223 Likewise, the Court’s post-Weatherford right to counsel cases have
been consistent in keeping fairness as the guiding principle. 224 Thus, rules for
analyzing government intrusion into attorney-client conversations must be
determined by what is fair.
The only fair rule is one that requires a showing of prejudice to the
defendant in order for an intrusion to be considered a violation of the Sixth
Amendment, or at least a violation that requires a remedy. 225 Although it was in a
different context, the Court all but said as much in Morrison when it stated: “absent
demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof, dismissal of the indictment is
plainly inappropriate, even though the violation may have been deliberate.” 226 If the
government intrudes into attorney-client communications, but overhears nothing or
uses nothing pertaining to the case that harms the defendant or aids the government,
a rule that punishes the government by requiring dismissal of the case would not be
fair to members of the public. 227 This rule recognizes the government’s legitimate
need to investigate crime in a way that protects the safety of its informants. 228 It also
recognizes the fact that the attorney-client privilege is subject to the crime-fraud
exception 229 because it would be unfair to the public to keep certain communications
confidential.
A fair rule is one that requires, for justifiable or unintentional intrusions, the
defendant to establish a prima facie showing of prejudice by demonstrating that

222. Id.
223. See supra notes 4–21 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 164–221 and accompanying text.
225. This may be a matter of semantics. The courts tend to use the term “violation” rather loosely in
the intrusion context. Courts often call an intrusion a “violation” when it is significant enough to entitle
the defendant to a remedy, but find that it is not a “violation” when the defendant is not entitled to a
remedy. Whether an intrusion that does not entitle a defendant to a remedy in a criminal case may still be
sufficient for civil damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is beyond the scope of this Article.
226. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365 (1981).
227. See id. at 364 (recognizing “the necessity for preserving society’s interest in the administration
of criminal justice”); see also United States v. Singer, 785 F.2d 228, 234 (8th Cir. 1986). (stating that
“[t]he interests supporting the sixth amendment right, meant to assure fairness in the adversary criminal
process, must be reconciled with society’s competing interest in prosecuting criminal conduct”).
228. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 557 (1977).
229. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
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confidential communications were conveyed to the government. 230 If a defendant
offers this prima facie proof, the burden shifts to the government to show that there
has not been and there will be no prejudice to the defendant as a result of the
intrusion. 231 However, when the intrusion is intentional and unjustifiable, a fair rule
is one that presumes there has been prejudice and requires the government to prove
that it has not used the confidential information to prejudice the defendant or benefit
itself in any manner. 232
If prejudice is established, a court must then address potential remedies. It
would be the rare case that would require dismissal as the remedy. Indeed, it would
be unfair to the public to dismiss a case when another remedy would suffice. As the
Supreme Court said in Nix, “[f]airness can be assured by placing the State and the
accused in the same positions they would have been in had the impermissible conduct
not taken place.” 233 Rather than dismissal, fairness can generally be achieved by
suppressing any statements obtained by the intrusion and possibly by barring
members of the prosecution team who received the statements from participating in
the trial. 234 However, fairness would allow the prosecution to introduce a defendant’s
statements to impeach the defendant’s inconsistent testimony at trial. 235
Of course, nothing in this proposed rule should be read to excuse or
encourage deliberate, unjustifiable intrusions into attorney-client communications.
Wise prosecutors should keep in mind that juries tend to have an innate sense of what
is fair and what is not. A prosecutor who introduces statements from deliberate,
unjustifiable intrusions runs the risk the jury may conclude that the prosecutor is
engaging in unfair conduct. Research has shown that even strangers who observe one
party acting unfairly towards another will attempt to punish the person who is acting
unfairly. 236 No attorney wants to be punished by a jury for what is perceived to be
unfair conduct.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Weatherford was decided over four decades ago, and it has been a source
of confusion and inconsistency ever since. This inconsistency is the very definition
of unfairness. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the attorney-client
communications that support it should be treated with consistency.
The Civil War general, Thomas F. Meagher, once stated that, “Great
interests demand great safeguards.” 237 Fairness in the criminal justice system is one
of the greatest of interests. It is time for the Supreme Court to safeguard this interest
230. See United States v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d 900, 907–08 (1st Cir. 1984) (citations omitted); United
States v. Danielson, 325 F.3d 1054, 1071 (9th Cir. 2003).
231. See Mastroianni, 749 F.2d at 908; Danielson, 325 F.3d at 1071.
232. See Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F.3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir. 1995).
233. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 447 (1984).
234. See United States v. Singer, 785 F.2d 228, 235–36 (8th Cir. 1986).
235. See, e.g., Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 593 (2009); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 351
(1980).
236. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 308 (2011). In fact, studies have shown
that this sort of altruistic punishment of unfair behavior increases activity in the pleasure centers of the
brain. Id.
237. MICHAEL CAVANAGH, MEMOIRS OF GEN. THOMAS FRANCIS MEAGHER 61 (1892).
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by establishing clear rules for analyzing government intrusion into attorney-client
conversations.

